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Following the Court of First Instance’s decision in Incorporated Owners of 
Century Centre v Bank of China (Hong Kong) Ltd [2011] 4 HKC 439, 
judgment creditors can enforce their judgment by registering a charge over 
property owned by the judgment creditor, but the registration ceases to have 
effect after fi ve years. This decision nevertheless suggests that the charge does 
not then lose all priority. Charges registered later but before registration of the 
fi rst charge expires will still be subject to it if creditors re-register them.
Introduction
Hong Kong’s venerable Land Registration Ordinance (LRO)1 nowadays 
rarely receives attention from the courts. In its 167th year and with its 
principal provisions untouched for most of that time, the meaning of the 
Ordinance is for the most part well-settled. Moreover, the Ordinance is 
on the way out: since 2004 a Land Titles Ordinance has been waiting to 
take the LRO’s place, so there is little incentive to consider the LRO. 
However, the issue which faced the court in this case was of practical 
importance to commercial lenders and will still arise if and when the 
land titles legislation comes into force.2 The question was of the priority 
of two registered charging orders where registration of the fi rst of the 
orders had been allowed to lapse, before its registration had been later 
renewed. Did the order registration of which had ceased lose priority to 
the later-registered order registration of which had continued?
Registration of most deeds and other documents affecting land is 
once-and-for-all. After the document has been recorded on the register, 
the registration stays in effect; the registration does not expire after a 
certain time and so does not need to be renewed. There is however an 
exception for charging orders and pending legal actions. Registration of 
these ceases to have effect automatically after fi ve years. Their registration 
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong. 
1 (Cap 128).
2 Amendments to the Land Titles Ordinance have been under consideration for seven years; it 
will not be brought into force until these have been agreed and enacted.
Competing Charging Orders: When 
No Effect has Some Effect
?
Malcolm Merry*
COMMENT
02_HKLJ-Malcolm Merry.indd   5 4/11/2012   5:42:11 PM
6 Malcolm Merry (2012) HKLJ
may be renewed, before, upon or after expiry, but the automatic expiry is 
a trap for the unwary creditor litigant. One of the lending banks in this 
case, or its solicitors, fell into that trap.
 Facts
What happened was that the owner of a fl at at Century Centre owed 
money (presumably management fees) to the Incorporated Owners of 
the building. As the debt remained unpaid, the IO applied to the court 
for permission to sell the property.3 This was granted in 2009 and the fl at 
was sold in 2011. After deduction of the outstanding debt and expenses 
from the proceeds of sale, a surplus of HK$1,734,357.71 remained. Who 
was entitled to that surplus?
Competing for the surplus were two judgment creditors of the fl at 
owner, each with charging orders registered against the property in 
execution of its money judgment. The fi rst was Bank of China (BoC) 
which had obtained its judgment in late 2000 and had been granted, 
and had registered, a charging order in June 2001. The second was 
The Hong  Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) which 
had obtained its judgment in mid-2002 and had been granted, and had 
registered, a charging order in August 2002. No diffi culty arose as to the 
priority of these charging orders: BoC, being the fi rst on the register, had 
priority by virtue of the provisions of s 3(1) of the LRO. This subsection 
says that precedence is given according to the chronological order of 
registration of instruments.
However, under s 17 of the LRO, the validity of the registration of 
each order expired after fi ve years. Section 17 provides simply that the 
registration of a judgment, order or lis pendens (pending land action) shall 
cease to have effect at the end of fi ve years from the date of registration, 
but it may be re-registered from time to time and, if so, shall have effect 
for fi ve years from the date of re-registration. In 2005, before expiry of the 
registration of its order in 2006, BoC had re-registered the order. HSBC 
did the same with its order, re-registering it in 2007. So at that stage, 
BoC’s charging order retained priority. 
Matters changed however on 13 August 2010 when the registration 
of BoC’s charging order expired without being renewed immediately. 
There was then an interval or gap of nearly seven weeks during which 
no registration of BoC’s order was in effect. During that period HSBC’s 
3 No doubt pursuant to a charge for unpaid fees; the judgment does not say and the order for sale 
by Yam J is not available.
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charging order (registration of which would not cease until 2012) 
remained effectively registered. BoC’s order was eventually re-registered, 
for the second time, on 29 September 2010.
Issues
Did the period of non-registration result in BOC’s losing priority to 
HSBC? In other words did the second re-registration of BoC’s charging 
order have effect only from the date of re-registration, so that the 
registration of HSBC’s charging order became fi rst in time? 
Contentions
The words of s 3(1) of the LRO would suggest so. This provides that 
all written instruments (including judgments and orders) “registered in 
pursuance hereof shall have priority one over the other according to the 
priority of their respective dates of registration”. In the cases of charging 
orders or lis pendens, priority is stipulated to run from the commencement 
of the day following the date of registration.4
BoC’s order was lodged for further re-registration on 29 September 
2010 so, applying the statutory rules, the re-registration took effect on 
30 September 2010 and not before. Moreover, s 4 of the LRO says that 
no notice whatsoever of any prior unregistered written instrument shall 
affect priority, so the fact that HSBC would have known about BoC’s 
temporarily unregistered charging order is not relevant to the question 
of priority. Section 17 states that a re-registered instrument shall have 
effect for fi ve years from the date of re-registration: this implies that the 
instrument the registration of which has expired does not have effect 
until it is re-registered. On this basis counsel for HSBC submitted that 
the further re-registration of BoC’s charging order commenced from the 
day following that re-registration only (30 September 2010) and that the 
order had lost its priority over HSBC’s order. 
Decision
Sakhrani J, however, did not agree. The judge pointed out that the 
forebears of s 17 of the LRO referred to sections in two English statutes 
4 LRO s 5A.
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of the early Victorian era, the Judgments Acts of 1839 and 1855. Those 
sections had concerned the priority of registered legal actions and 
judgments and had provided that their registration would expire after 
fi ve years but that they could be re-registered. Their provisions had been 
considered in two English cases. 
Authorities
In Beavan v Earl of Oxford,5 circumstances analogous with the present case 
had been before the English Court of Appeal. Two judgment creditors, B 
and C, had registered their judgments, in 1841 and 1848 respectively. B 
had failed to re-register until 1847, after expiry after fi ve years, but had 
done so by 1848 when C’s judgment had been registered. Then in 1849 
a third judgment creditor, T, registered his judgment. Registration of B’s 
judgment again expired in 1852: it was re-registered, but two months after 
expiry. In January 1854, T re-registered his judgment just before expiry 
of fi ve years. In September 1853, registration of C’s judgment expired; 
it was re-registered more than a year later, in November 1854. So T’s 
judgment had always been effectively registered from fi rst registration 
in 1849 and during that time registration of the judgments of each of 
B and C had lapsed for a period. Had they lost priority to T? The Lord 
Chancellor, Lord Cranworth, ruled that they had not. An omission 
to re-register had no effect upon previous creditors, he held. This was 
because at the time that a previous creditor registered his judgment, 
notice of the existence of the prior judgment had been given to him 
through the effective registration of the prior judgment. The object 
of the legislation was to enable a judgment creditor to ascertain what 
other judgments already existed, not to give him a chance of improving 
his position by the possible subsequent neglect of a judgment creditor 
to re-register. The Lord Chancellor explained that “there could be no 
object in protecting those who had thought fi t to become … creditors in 
spite of a judgment of which the register had already apprised them”. So, 
B and C had priority when T’s judgment was registered, T knew this, and 
B and C’s priority over T was not affected by their subsequent omission 
to register again at the end of fi ve years.
A creditor whose judgment or charge comes on the register subsequent 
to judgments or charges registered earlier is therefore always inferior to 
the holders of those earlier registrations notwithstanding that an interval 
5 (1855) 6 De GM & G 492, 43 ER 1325; hereinafter Beavan. 
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in the earlier registrations may subsequently occur. What, through, of a 
creditor whose judgment or charge is fi rst registered during that interval? 
The Lord Chancellor’s reasoning would suggest that such a creditor would 
have precedence over the earlier, lapsed registrations. This is indeed 
what the Lord Chancellor held. Neglect to renew a registration after 
fi ve years, he said, “will of course deprive the judgment creditor of his 
rights against subsequent … creditors becoming so before any re-registry 
has taken place, and so will operate as a protection to them”.6 
The Court of Appeal’s decision in Beavan was later approved by the 
House of Lords in Shaw v Neale.7 In the latter, the new Lord Chancellor, 
Lord Chelmsford, confi rmed his predecessor’s view that the intent of s 4 
of the Judgments Act 1839 was to give a registered incumbrancer the 
benefi t of registration for fi ve years so as to protect him from those who 
might purchase, mortgage or become creditors during that period and 
during any subsequent period of re-registration. But, Lord Chelmsford LC 
added, if after expiration of the fi rst fi ve years, the incumbrancer omitted 
to re-register and in the intervening period before his re-registration, 
a person became a registered mortgagee or purchaser of the estate or 
creditor of the owner, the subsequent re-registration would not prevail 
over that person’s interest.8 
Discussion
In deciding in favour of BoC in the present case, Sakhrani J relied 
heavily upon the reasoning in Beavan and Shaw. Was he correct to do 
so? Both were decisions upon the interpretation of a particular English 
provision, s 4 of the Judgments Act 1839. The wording of that section is 
more elaborate than the wording of s 17 of the LRO. Section 17 merely 
says that the registration of a judgment, order or lis pendens shall “cease 
to have effect” at the end of fi ve years from the date of registration, but 
that the judgment, order or lis may be re-registered from time to time 
and, if so re-registered, shall have effect for fi ve years from the date 
of re-registration. By contrast s 4 of the 1839 Act provided that after 
fi ve  years’ registration, judgments and orders shall “be null and void” 
as to purchasers, mortgagees or creditors unless a memorandum of the 
judgment or order is left with the Court (i.e. re-registered) within 
6 Beavan, 499.
7 (1858) 6 HL Cas 581, 10 ER 1422; hereinafter Shaw.
8 Shaw, 605; Lord Cranworth, the retired Lord Chancellor, was a member of the House of Lords 
panel too and not surprisingly confi rmed his earlier judgment in Beavan.
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fi ve years before the execution of the instrument vesting or transferring 
of the right or interest to the purchaser, mortgagee or creditor.
Sakhrani J’s justifi cation for treating decisions upon s 4 of the Act as 
helpful in the interpretation of s 17 of the Ordinance seems to have been 
that previously s 17 referred to and incorporated provisions of the 1839 
Act as well as two other English Judgments Acts and that intervening 
amendments had simply introduced modern terminology in place of 
the old references. However, those references have long gone as have 
the Acts themselves, so the effect of expiration of registration and of 
re-registration would seem to be a matter of interpretation of the words 
of s 17 as they stand rather than a matter of interpretation of the words of 
those old provisions. Whilst amendments to s 17 may have been intended 
to introduce modern terminology, that does not preclude an effect of 
changing the law as well, whether deliberately or by inadvertence.
Nor is it immediately apparent that the results in Beavan and in Shaw 
are correct. If a provision states that registration of an instrument lasts 
only for a certain time and after that time the instrument shall have no 
effect or shall be void until re-registered, one could easily interpret that 
as meaning that the instrument loses all priority after that time. To some 
it may seem unfair that the holder of a later charging order should remain 
bound by a previous charging order that has become void or ineffective, 
especially since the period between expiry and re-registration of the 
previous order could be lengthy. It might be said that although the holder 
of the later charging order is aware of the earlier order at the time of the 
registration of his later charge, he has an expectation that if registration 
of the earlier order is not renewed prior to expiry of fi ve years from its 
registration and thereby becomes void, his charge will thenceforth have 
priority. 
Nevertheless, the judge’s reliance upon the reasoning in the old 
authorities can be justifi ed. The position facing Sakhrani J was for 
practical purposes the same as that which faced the English courts. There 
is nothing express in s 17 about the effect of expiration or of re-registration 
on later judgments or orders. The wording of s 4 of the Act, although 
lengthy, says nothing about the effect of expiration or re-registration 
beyond saying that on expiry the judgment or order shall be null and 
void against creditors. There is no indication as to whether this means all 
creditors or just those who register during the period of non-registration: 
that was the issue decided in Beavan and confi rmed in Shaw. 
The reasoning in those cases does however create a logical diffi culty. 
BoC’s charge retained priority over HSBC’s despite the interval during 
which BoC’s was not registered. Had a third chargor registered during 
the interval, BoC’s charge would have lost priority to the third charge, 
02_HKLJ-Malcolm Merry.indd   10 4/11/2012   5:42:11 PM
Vol 42 Part 1 Competing Charging Orders 11
according to the dicta. Yet as between HSBC and the third chargor, 
HSBC retains priority because registration of the latter’s charge was 
current at the time of registration of the third charge. Which order of 
priority then applies between the three charges? 
Conclusion
In effect, the courts’ answer was that one should look at the state of 
the register at the date of registration of the second judgment or order 
rather than at the state of the register at the date or re-registration of 
the earlier judgment or order. This renders the ceasing of effect of the 
expired order somewhat illusory but is at least clear and workable.
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